A labor supply model for married couples with non-convex budget sets and latent rationing by Dagsvik, John K. & Strøm, Steinar
Discussion Paper
Central Bureau of Statistics, P.B. 8131 Dep, 0033 Oslo 1, Norway
No. 36 	 June 1988
A LABOR SUPPLY MODEL FOR MARRIED COUPLES WITH
NON-CONVEX BUDGET SETS AND LATENT RATIONING3
BY
JOHN K. DAGsvIK1 AND STEINAR STRØM 2
40
1) Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, Norway.
2) University of Oslo, Norway.
3) We are grateful for helpful comments and encouragements
from Michael Hanemann, Ingemar Hansson, Jim Heckman,
Francois Laisney, Jeff Perloff, Charles Stuart and Jim
Walker at different stages of the project. In addition to
the authors Rolf Aaberge, Liv Daasvatn, Olav Ljones, Anne
Sagsveen and Tom Wennemo at the Central Bureau of
Statistics have contributed. Tom Wennemo is responsible
for the programming of the model.
Not to be quoted without permission from author(s). Comments welcome.
Abstract 
The basic assumption in this paper is that individuals make
their choices from a set of latent discrete alternatives,
called matches. Given the match, hours of work, wages and
non-pecuniary characteristics follow. This model allows for
very general budget specifications as well as restrictions on
job opportunities and hours of work. The model is estimated on
Norwegian data from 1979. Some of the results are summarized
in wage elasticities and it is demonstrated that they are in
the range of what others have obtained. Moreover, aggregate
elasticities Which reflect observed as well as unobserved
heterogeneity are calculated. We also report estimates derived
from alternative specifications of the budget set, ranging
from ignorance of taxes at all to a detailed specification of
all sorts of taxes and transfers. The results of tax policy





This paper presents a new econometric framework for ana-
lyzing labor supply. By labor supply we mean the decision of
whether or not to work and the decision of how many hours to
work, or from the econometrician's point of view, the hours of
work distribution Which includes participation probabilities.
The hours of work distribution is derived from a random
utility model. The utilities are perceived as random because
as econometricians we do not observe all the variables that
influence the individual's decisions. These variables are
assumed to be known to the individual and we do not consider
the case where the individual is uncertain about say, tax
rates, wages and job opportunities.
The principal purpose of our study is to model and esti-
mate the hours of work distribution when all details of the
tax system are taken into account. This is a demanding task
also because the Norwegian tax system, as the tax system in
most of the other countries in the Western world, implies a
non-convex budget set. The option of joint and separate tax-
ation, social security rules and tax allowances turn an other-
wise progressive tax structure into a structure which is not
uniformly progressive, rather partially regressive. These
features of the tax structure create a non-convex budget set.
Fixed costs of working contribute to this non-convexity as
job-specific wage tariffs also do (see Moffitt [23]). There-
fore, the traditional marginal calculus is no longer suf-
ficient to simulate optimal behavior. Global rather than local
criteria have to be applied. Of course, an important question
is whether a detailed budget specification really matters. We
argue that even if the model specification is robust with
respect to approximations of the budget constraints, an exact
treatment of the tax system is of considerable interest in the
context of policy simulations. This is so because it enables
us to specify quite general tax regimes without having to
"translate" these regimes into the corresponding approximate
ones that enter the model.
Most of the labor supply studies have used the counter-
factual assumption of a convex smooth budget set (cf. early
contributions such as Rosen [27], Nakamura and Nakamura [24],
Wales and Woodland [24] and more - recent contributions by
Blundell et al [6], Kohlase [20] and Ransom [26]). Only re-
cently there have been attempts to take the non-convexity
properties of the tax structure into account. These attempts
are usually versions of the approach suggested by Burtless and
Hausman [7] (cf. Arrufat and Zabalza [2], Blomquist [4],
Hausman [li], [12], [13], Hausman and Ruud, [15]. However,
from an econometric point of view the Hausman approach is not
ideal. When the number of tax brackets gets large, the Hausman
model seems complicated to estimate. For example, the corre-
sponding likelihood function is not in general globally con-
cave in the unknown parameters. When the detailed tax struc-
ture for married couples is taken into account (with the
options of joint taxation for some incomes, as in Norway and
the UK, or with joint or split taxation, as in France and
West-Germany), the Hausman approach is likely to be extremely
cumbersome unless quite restrictive simplifying assumptions on
functional forms are introduced such as linear or log-linear.
labor supply curves. These functional forms exclude apriori
the backward bending case. Also for simulation purposes the
Hausman approach seems complicated to apply.
In contrast to. the traditional approach in the analysis
of labor supply (see Killingsworth [19] for a review of
models) we have adopted a theoreticà1 framework in which some
of the unobservables are interpreted as choice variables.
Specifically, the choice environment is assumed to consist of
a set of opportunities, called matches, where each match
corresponds to a particular combination of individual abili-
ties offered, skills required to perform certain tasks or
activities and other non-skill'attributes of jobs such as
working in polluting environments, etc. Apart from wage and
hours of work, the quality of a match, relative to the indi-
vidual, depends on the "tension" between the abilities offered
and skills demanded as well as of non-pecuniary attributes
related to these activities. For a given match we assume
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throughout this paper that the wage rate and hours of work are
fixed : Thus the individual maximizes his utility with respect
to discrete latent alternatives (matches) characterized by
wage rates, hours of work and non-pecuniary attributes. Our
theoretical model is related to the Matching models of
Tinbergen [28], Hartog [10] and Heckman and Sedlacek [18]. The
implied hours of work distribution has a similar form as the
continuous logit model and it is particularly convenient for
dealing with general budget constraints.
The set of matches available to the individual is, as
mentioned above, latent and it is represented by a probability
distribution. Specifically, this distribution describes the
fraction of market matches with a particular combination of
hours and wages that is feasible to the individual. Thus, the
framework is consistent with the notion of rationing with
respect to job-offers as well as with respect to the allowed
amount of hours worked in different jobs. Thus the framework
allows us to take into account the fact that the fraction of
full-time jobs is higher than the fraction of other jobs. Of
course, the consentration of jobs around full-time jobs can be
due to preference, but most likely this is not the Whole
truth. Regulations enforced by firms or by the authorities may
restrict the set of feasible jobs to full-time, part-time
jobs, etc. Since the framework allows for a rationing of job-
offers it means that unemployment can be accounted for in the
estimation.
The assumption that hours of work is fixed for a given
match implies that the model satisfies the assumption of "in-
dependence from irrelevant alternatives" (IIA). In Section 6
of this paper we report the results of a series of tests of
the IIA- property. In Dagsvik [8] the more general case is
considered in which the worker is free to choose hours of work
from a match-specific choice set. The corresponding hours of
work distribution is a continuous version of a generalized
extreme value random utility model, see McFadden [22]. How-
ever, this version of the model is complicated to estimate.
The empirical part of our paper deals with labor supply
of married couples in Norway 1979. In our approach we assume
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that the couple's desicions concerning labor supply are made
simultaneously. All previous studies of labor supply with
taxes, except for Hausman and Ruud [15] and Ransom [26] assume
that the wife takes the husband's income as given.In a labor
supply study without taxes Ashenfelter and Heckman [13] found
that the cross elasticities were significantly different from
zero. There is no a priori reason to expect these cross
elasticities to vanish when taxes are taken into account.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we present the individual decision model which includes a
characterization of the stochastic properties of the unobserv-
ables. In Section 3 the probability distribution function for
the labor supply and the realized wage rate is derived for
one-person households and in Section 4 this model is extended
to two-person households. Data and the Norwegian tax rules are
described and discussed in Section 5 and Appendix , respec-
tively. The data set contains detailed information about taxes
and income since it is based on filled-in tax returns that are
in principle checked by local taxation authorities. In Section
6 we present the estimation results. Wage elasticities are
reported in Section 7. In Section 8 we report the results from
estimating the model under alternative specifications of the
budget set and in Section 9 we give the results of tax policy
simulations.
2. Random utilities and latent choice variables.
In recent econometric analyses of labor supply one starts
by specifying either the direct or the indirect utility
function. From this specification and from the budget set the
Tabor supply function is derived. This function is perceived
as random since many of the variables that affect the indi-
vidual preferences are not Observed by the econometrician.
Usually the specification of the distributional properties of
the random terms are made ad. hoc. One reason for this seems
to be that the random elements of the model are believed to be
of minor importance. Another reason is that it may be diffi-
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cult to provide theoretical arguments to support the Choice of
distribution functions because economic theory seldom gives
any guidance in that matter.
Our point of departure is that some of the unobservables
are choice variables and that the individual's choice of opti-
mum values for the unobserved choice variables are not made 
independently of the level of consumption and hours worked.
These two variables are the only choice variables that are
observed.
A formal discussion and interpretation of the latent
choice environment is given in Dagsvik [8]. Here we shall
consider some main points.
Important examples of unobserved choice variables are
type of job and type of leisure or non-market activities such
as schooling, spots, household activities, etc. By type of
job we understand the specific tasks performed at the job, the
type of qualifications or skills demanded.to perform these
tasks and other non-skill attributes of the job like working
conditions, location, commuting distance, etc. Similarly,
non-market alternatives may be identified in an analogues way.
Non-market alternatives also demand certain skills to perform
the tasks associated with the different types of activities.
The individual's set of available opportunities depends
on his skills or abilities. These are a mixture of inherited
abilities and qualifications obtained through education and
training. Following Tinbergen [28] the individual's choice of
market and non-market positions is a process in which the
individuals try to obtain the best match of personal abilities 
and skills required to perform certain activities. We extend
Tinbergen's approach by assuming that positions and non-skill
attributes of the different activities may have a direct in-
fluence on preferences. We call a particular combination of
skills offered, skills required to perform certain tasks, and
non-skill attributes associated with these tasks a match. We
assume that the individual finds the optimal match, among the
set of feasible matches, by evaluating how well he is fit for
a particular task jointly with his taste for that task and for
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the non-skill attributes of these tasks.
For the moment suppose that the set of skills is fihite
and can be defined and numbered from 1,2,...,n. Skills offered
and skills required in each task are both to be found on this
list. For example, one combination could be offered skill no j
and requirede skill no j. In this case there is a perfect
match of skills. A mismatch may be due to the fact that some
individuals prefer to have a job with skill requirements dif-
ferent from what follows from education and training. In the
short run offered skills as well as required skills are given.
The total number of combinations of offered and required
skills is n2 . In addition we define m attributes of tasks
which can be distinguished from skill requirements. Examples
are working conditions, location, commuting distance, etc.
Altogether this gives N E mn2 combinations of skills and non
skills attributes. Each combination is called a match and the
universe of matches is enumerated by a discrete variable, z =
1,2,...,N. In the econometric model developed later we assume,
however, that this universe is infinite.
Throughout this paper we assume a match-specific wage
rate, W(z). The wage rate thus depends on offered skills,
required skills and non-skill attributes of different tasks.
This assumption differs slightly from Tinbergen [28] who
prices out skills and from Heckman and Sedlacek [18] who price
out tasks. In the latter paper a sector-specific function is
defined that maps individual skills into sector-specific
amounts of tasks performed.. Tasks are priced out according to
the value of marginal productivity in the diffei'ent sectors.
In our framework each individual has to choose his match from
his set of feasible matches. The wage rates that are feasible
to each individual depend on this choice set. Later, indi-
vidual characteristics such as education and experience will
be introduced to parametrize these individual choice sets.
Thus, in our framework neither tasks nor skills are priced
out, but matches. Wages might therefore differ according to
offered skills, required skills and non-skill attributes of
jobs. Sectoral specifications are not introduced, but these
can easily be incorporated.
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As noted above we agsume that hours of work is given when
the match is given. This assumption means either that diffe-
rent tasks require a fixed amount of hours or that hours of
work is regulated by the authorities, through negotiations
between employers and unions, etc. The econometrics of the
more general case when hours are allowed to vary for a given -
match is outlined in Dagsvik [8].
Let H(z) denote hours of work related to match z and let
T(z) represent the non-pecuniary attributes of match z. Thus,
the choice environment is described by a distribution of
wages, W(z), hours, H(z), and non-pecuniary attributes, T(z).
This multidimensional distribution is 'objective' in the sense
that it is the same for all individuals. As noted in the in-
troduction, we assume that all individuals have a perfect
knowledge of this distribution.
Individual choices are assumed to follow from the maxi-
mization of utility given the budget constraint and the match-
and hour-constraints.
Let U(C,h,z) denote the utility for a one-person house-
hold where C is annùal consumption, h is houri worked a year
and z is the match. The reason why z enters the utility func-
tion is of course not because utility depends on the numbering
of alternatives, but because the argument z in the utility
function takes care of other aspects of the match than C and
h. The individuals' decision problem is to choose between
discrete alternatives, i.e., matches, z, characterized by W(z)
and T(z) subject to the following two constraints:
(2.1)
	
C = f(hW(z) + I)	 : Budget constraint
(2.2)
	
h = H(z), z e B,	 : Constraint on hours worked
and the choice set of
matches.
where f is the function that transforms gross income into
consumption. The form of the function f depends on the tax
system and rules of social security payments, etc. It may be
non-differentiable,non-concave and even discontinuous at some
points. This corresponds to how the tax systems are in many
countries. I is non-labor income and B is the set of feasible
matches. This set varies across individuals and it depends on
education and training.
The key issue in the present paper is that we do not
observe the discrete alternatives or matches, z. As econo-
metricians,we are forced to consider these alternatives as
latent. An essential assumption in the present paper is that
these latent variables are choice variables and that the
utility function has the structure
10 	 (2.3)	 U(h,C,z) = v(h,'C,T(z)) + e(z),
where v(.) is a deterministic function in the sense that for
given values of h, C and T, v is a constant. {T(z), e(z)} is
an enumeration of the points of the bivariate Poisson process




X(t)dte -xdx , 	 f X(t)dt < co
0
where X(t) is a positive function.
This means that the probability that there is a match for
which
(T(z)e(t,t + dt)) n(e(z)e(x,x +_dx))
is equal to
X(t)dte- xdx + o(dtdx).
Moreover, the expected fraction of matches for which







In order to facilitate interpretation of the random points
{T(z), e(z)} and to establish the link to discrete choice models
assume for a moment that the size of the universe of matches is given
and equal to N (say).. Then an equivalent representation of the utility
function is
v(11,C, T(z)) + n(z)
where n(z), z=1,2,..,N, are independent draws from the extreme value_ n
distribution, exp(-e ).The variables n(z) account for the fact that
for a given match the taste for this match varies across individuals
and it is thus perceived as random. However, for a given z the
attribute value, T(z), is the same relative to every individual and it
is therefore non-stochastic. But the set of feasible matches B varies
across individuals which implies that the set of attribute values for
the feasible matches varies from one individual to another..
Consequently, we may interpret the set of feasible matches as random
and thus their respective attribute values becomes random. Since the
conditional distribution of n(z) for given z is independent of z the
unconditional distribution of n(z) across individuals and matches will_ n
also be exp(-e 	 ).
In the general case N is stochastic and since by (2.4) the
intensity measure of {T(z)} is A.(t)dt it follows that N is Poisson
distributed with expected number of points given by
EN 	 T X(t)dt
which is finite by assumption. However the expected number of points
of {T(z),e(z)} is infinite which means that there may occur several
values, of e(z) to one value of T(z). We may then adopt the rule that
whenever multiplisity of e(z) occurs then the largest value is used.
It is clear that this rule does not alter the results of the following
section.
Assumptions that yield (2.3) are
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(i) The utilities are stochastically independent and
identically distributed across matches.
(ii) The individual selects the optimal match according to
the axiom "independence from irrelevant alternatives".
(IIA) I
Proofs as well as equivalent assumptions are given in
Dagsvik [8]. Assumption (i) is a standard assumption that
states that preferences are purely random across måtches.
Assumption (ii) is the famous Luce axiom, Luce [21]. Since the
empirical content of a match is not specified, assumption (ii)
is quite weak. We might in fact define the different types of
matches so as to obtain IIA.
Let
U (h,C) = max U(h,C,z).
Then U is the utility of the observed "commodities" (h,C).
3. The distribution of the realized wage and hours of work 
In this section we consider the distribution of the indi-
vidual's realized wage and labor supply.
For expository simplicity we shall consider the deri-
vation of the hours of work distribution for the case where B
is giver) so that H(z), W(z) and T(z) are non - stochastic,
'After inserting the hours and budget constraint, the
utility can be written
(3.1)
	
u z = a(H(z),W(z),T(z)) + e(z) .
'where
a(H(z),W(z),T(z)) = v(H(z),f(H(z)W(z) + I),T(z))
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and where e(z) are independent draws from the extreme value
distribution. It is well known that the corresponding choice
probabilities have the form (see McFadden [22])
(3.2) exp1a(H(z),W(z),T(z))1 P(uz 	ilex u.) -
J	 E	 expLa(H(j),W(j),T(j))j
jeB
This model is often called the Luce model (cf. Luce
[21]). Let A(11,w,t) denote the set of feasible matches.for
which H(z) = h, W(z) = w, T(z) = t. Then we realize that the
probability, p(h,w,t), of selecting a match with attribute
values (h,w,t) is given by




where n(h,w,t) is the number of matches in A(h,w,t).
Let
cl(h,w,t) = n(h,w,t)En(w,y,r) •
x,y,r
Thus, q(h,w,t) is the relative number of available .
matches with attributes (h,w,t).
From 3.3) we get
E q(h,w,t)exp(a(h,w,t))
(3.4) p(h,w) E E p(h,w,t) - t	 E q(x,y,r)exp(a(x,y,r))
,x,y,r
where p(h,w) is the probability density that the optimal job
has wage w and hours of work h. In other words, p(h,w) is the
joint density of the realized wage and hours of work.
Now, let us turn to a more general case and let, ana-
logously to G(t) in (2.5), G 2 (w,t,h) be the (expected)
fraction of feasible matches for which (W(z)4t, O<H(z)411). In
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other words, G2 (w,t,h) is the 
probability that a randomly
selected match, z, satisfies (W(z)‹w, T(z)t, O<H(z)<h). As-
sume that the density of G 2 , g 2 , exists and let g i -be the
(expected) fraction of feasible matches for which H(z) eK
where K is the set of feasible hours. Furthermore, let
go = 1-g1
and let
g4 ( wsh ) = f g2(w,t,h)dt.
The probabilities g l and g o represent the shares of
feasible market and non-market opportunities, respectively.
Specifically, gl is the probability that a random draw from
the set of feasible matches is a market match. The density g4
represents the frequency of market matches with hours h and
wages w.When the number of matches is random and generated by the
(positive) Poisson distribution described above then it can be demonstrated
that the continuous version corresponding to (3.4) is
(3.5) 	 (0(h,w,K) g iv( h ,w
)
govo 4- givi(K)
for h > 0, heK, and
g V
0 0 (3.6) 	 (0(0,K) -
gOVO 	 g1V1(K)
where
(3.7) 	 V(h,w) = f exp(v(h,f(hw+I),t))g 2 (w,t,h)dt,
(3.8) V




v o . = f exp(v(0,f(I),t))g 3 (t)dt
and g 3 (t) is the marginal density of T(z), given that H(z)=0.
Notice that (3.5) allows a "frequency type" inter-
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pretation.: The numerator of (0(h,w,K) is the mean utility across
the suitable matches with attributes (h,w) and is thus the
expected value of the favourable outcomes. The denominator is
the mean utility across all available matches and it is there-
fore the expected value of all the possible outcomes.
From (3.5) and (3.6) we immediately realize that the odds
ratios of 4(h,w,K) are independent of the choice sets, e.g.,




) '	 h 2 )eK 1 nK 2
As is wellknownthis property is equivalent to Luce
choice axiom, also called "independence from irrelevant al-
ternatives". As mentioned above this property makes it pos-
sible to carry out an empirical test of the structure (3.5)
and (3.6). Note however that if also g 2 depends on K, then IIA
does not hold true. A rejection of IIA can therefore only be
interpreted as a rejection of either (i), (ii), (2.2) or the
functional forms for v and g 2 .
For the purpose of empirical implementation we shall
simplify (3.5) and (3.6). Let
(3.10) exp(p(h,C,w)) = Efexp(v(h,C,T(z)))IH(z) = h,14(z) = w)}
g2(w,t,h)
= f exp(v(h,C,t)) 





exp(4)(0,C)) = Efexp(v(0,C,T(z)))11-3(z) = 0
1 (t)dt
= f exp(v(0,C,t)) 	
g0
Eqs. (3.10) and (3.11) define the
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mean utility across all matches conditional on H(z) . = h, W(z)
= 	 and H(z) = 0, respectively. Note that 4,(h,C,w) may depend
on w since T(z) and W(z) may be interdependent. In the case
where T(z) and W(z) are independent (1) becomes a function of
(h,C) solely.
. From (3.7)-(3.11) it follows that
V(h,w) = exp(4)(h,f(hw+I),w))g4 (w,h)
and
Vo 	 = exp((0,f(I))).
ID 	 We assume that W(z) and H(z) are independent, i.e.,
(3.12)
	
g4 ( w , h ) = g5 ( w)g6 ( h ) •
This does not imply, however, that there is no dependency
between observed wages and observed hours worked. On the con-
trary, the conditional distribution of wages, given hours of
work, is under the hypothesis of (3.12), given by
(h,w,K) (3.13) (01(w,K1h) 	 f(01h,y,K)dy
exp(4)(h,f(hw+I),w))g (w) 
exp(4)(h,f(hy+I),y)g 5 (y)dy •
for h >
From (3.13) we realize that we can write
E(WIK) = 	 E exp 	 h,f hW+I ,W
where the expectation operator on the right hand side is taken
with respect to g5 . By a first order Taylor approximation of
the denominator and the numerator we get, assuming that T(z)
and W(z) are independent,




provided f(.) is differentiable. In the case where f is linear
and hEW+I is kept constant E(W1h) becomes linear in h with a
positive slope provided np/aif > O. This demonstrates that the
empirical "evidence" of the wage rate being dependent on hours
of work may be explained by selectivity.
Furthermore, the conditional wage distribution given that
h > 0, is given by
f exp(4)(x,f(xw+I),w))g 5 (w)g 6 (x)dx
(3.14) x>0,xeK 4) 2 (w,K1h>0) _ exp((t)(x,f(xy+I),Y))g5(y)g6(x)dydx •
x>0
xeK
Formulas (3.13) and (3.14) correspond to the wellknown
selectivity bias problem, Heckman [16], namely that in general
the conditional wage distribution given that the individual
works, q) 2 (•), differs from the unconditional wage distri-
bution, g 5 .
In some studies only working individuals are analyzed and
observed wage rates are applied when estimating the model. A
study of this type is reported in Anderson et al [1]. The
conditional distribution of hours of work given the wage and
given that the individual works, 4) 3 (h,K1w), is given by
(h	 K) 	exp((p(h,f(hw+I),w))g4(w,h)t,w, (3.15)(0 3 (h,K1w) - fq)(x,w,K)dx	 f expWx,f(xw+I),w))g4 (w,x)dx	 •
x>0	 x>0
xeK	 xeK
for h > 0, h e K.
Note that while the traditional labor supply models are
silent about rationing of jobs, the structure of (3.5) and
(3.6) allows variations in market opportunities to be expli-
citly accounted for through the ratio gi /go . Similarly to
Blundell et al [6] we may for example specify this ratio as a
parametric function of labor market indicators such as
regional unemployment rates, and individual characteristics
such as education - and training.
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4. 	 Extension of the model to two-person households (married 
couples). 
The decision problem of a married couple is to decide the
labor supply of the wife and the husband as well as the level
of consumption of the household subject to the budget and
hours constraints.
Let U(hF , hm , C, z) denote the household's utility func-
tion Where hF , hm denotes the wifes and the husbands hours of
work, respectively. C is total consumption of the household
and z = (zF' z M ) is an index of the matches of the wife, z F ,
and husband, zm, respectively.
The constraints are given by
C = f(hFW F (z F ), hmWm (zm ),I)
(h F' hM ) = (HF (z F ), HM (z M )), z e B y,
where HF (zF ), WF (z F ), HM (zM) and WM (zM ) are the match-specific
hours of work and wages for the wife and husband, respec-
tively. Under assumptions that are straight forward extensions
of the assumptions of the preceding section we can write
(4.3)	 ti(hp,hm,C,z) = v(h F ,hm ,C,T(z)) + e(z)
where IT(z), e(z)1 is. an enumeration of the points of the 'Poisson
process on [0,03W-03,03H With intensity as described in
Section 2. We define g 11 as the (expected) fraction of the
feasible market matches for the couple that satisfies HF (z)eK,
H (z)eK. g ol is the (expected) fraction of the feasible
matches that are market matches for the male with H(z)€K and
non-market matches for the wife. g10 is defined analogously
(by replacing husband with wife) and
goo ' 1-g11	 glo	 gol
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Let G22 (wF ,wm ,hF ,11_) be the (expected) fraction of the-M




F' WM(Z)WM, HF 	 F'
(z)4h 	 HM (z)4hm )
•
and let G (wM' h M ) be the expected fraction of feasible market2f1 
matches for the husband and non-market matches for the wife
for which (Wm (z)(wm ,Hm (z)4wm) and similarly G 2 F(wF'hF) for
the wife. As in Section 3 let
1 (4.4) exp{(p(hF ,hm ,C,wF ,wm )}
= Efexp(v(hF ,hm ,C,T(z))) I HF (z) = hF ,Hm (z) = hm ,
W
F( z) = wF ,WM (z) = w 1
(4.5) 	 exp{(1)(h F ,O,C,wF )}
= . Efexp(v(hF ,O,C,T(z))) I H (z) = 0,HF (z) = hF
WF (z) = wF}
(4.6) 	 exp(q)(0,hm ,C,wm ))
= Efexp(v(0,hm ,C,T(z))) I HF (z) = 0 1 Hm (z) = hM
W (z) =
and
(4.7)	 exp(4)(0,0 1 C))= Efexp(v(0,0,C,T(z))) I HF) = Hm(z)= 01.
Similarly to Section 3 we can now express the joint
density of hours and 'wages. Here we shall only consider the








+g V (K)+g V (K)+gg00	 0 OF	 01 OM	 11
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The data are obtained from two different data sources
with information about married couples in Norway, 1979. The
first source is a questionnaire which contains data on hours
worked, wage rates and socio-economic variables such as the
number and age of children and education level. The other
source is based on filled in and approved tax reports and
yield detailed information about all sorts of reported income,
legal deductions, taxes paid and transfer payments received.
The two sets of data are linked on the basis of personal
identification numbers. The Central Bureau of Statistics has
been responsible for collecting and preparing the data sets.
The data based on the tax reports have been used to check
the answers on the wage rates and hours worked given in the
questionnaire. For around 90 per cent of those working the
reported wage rate has been used. For the remaining indi-
viduals, including some reported working, observations are
drawn from an estimated wage distribution. The quality of the
hours observations was considered to be so poor (data for hours
last week) that instead we have calculated the hours worked
per year by dividing the reported labor income per year by the
reported or predicted wage rate.
In table I we report some statistics for the average of
the sample. The sample selection miles are as ' follows,
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Only couples where the age of the husband is less than 66 years and the
age of the wife is between 27 and 66 years are included. Both wife and
husband are wage earners or not working.Couples for which the wife's or
husband's hours of work is above 3600 hours per year is excluded. When
the female wage rate is below 15- or above 56 NOK it is replaced by a
draw from the estimated wage distribution mentioned above. The same
procedure is followed when the male wage rate is below 24- or above 74
NOK. The resulting sample size is 778. In the simulation experiments
reported below the sample size is; however, 815 because the couples with
high reported hours of work have been included.
Notice that not working is defined to be less than or equal to 60




6. Estimation results 
•	 The densities in (4.11)-(4.14) are used to construct the
likelihood function applied in the estimation of the model. A
maximum likelihood procedure has been used. The consumption
function is defined by
(6.1) C = f(wMh M ,wFh F ,I) = E 	 w 41.1 4+1 - S(wFb , wmhm ,I)j=M,F J J
where I denotes capital income and S(.) is the tax function.
In the calculation of f(-) for alternative values of h i ,
j=M,F, all details concerning the tax structure of 1979, as
outlined in Appendix , are taken into account.
In order to estimate the model we need to specify
functional forms for (1)(hF ,hm ,C,wF ,wm),( )-4F -wF - ' g4F(hF) and
g 5m (hm). We have chosen cp to be quadratic, separable in con-
sumption and leisure after having performed a preliminary
estimation with a general quadratic specification. Only the
leisure terms are assumed to depend on household character-
istics. The densities q 4F -(w ) and g 4 (w) are chosen to be- -
log-normal densities. The densities associated with the latent
rationing assumptions related to hours are assumed to be of
the form
g 5 (h) = dF exp(-(h F-EF ) 2 a F 	bFD(h F )
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where dF , aF , hF , and bF are parameters, and D(hF ) is an indi-




The indicator function D allows for a peak at "full-time"
hours. When aF = bF = 0 the rationing distribution reduces to
the uniform distribution. When aF = 0 the distribution is
uniform apart from a peak at full time hours.
For the males the corresponding density is assumed to be
of the form
g 5 (hm ) = dm exp(-(hm-iim ) 2am + b D(h M
We have experimented with a peak at part-time hours of
work, but it turned out to be of minor importance.
Since cp is a quadratic form we get that
(I) E (1)(h F ,hm ,C,WF ,Wm) -I- log g 5 (h) + log g 5 (h) - log(dd)
2= a 1 C + a 2 C
2 + a 3 LF + a 4LF + a 5 L F log AF
+ a 6L FLm + a 7L FBU6 + a 8L FB06 +	 alOLM
allLM log Am + bFD(h F ) + bmD(hm )
where L, is leisure time per year, L, = 8000-h A is age,
J	 J
BU6 and B06 are number of children below and above 6 years of
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age, j=M,F.
Moreover the log odds ratio of feasible non-market
matches to market matches are parametrized in the following
way





log ( goo 	=a	 +a E +a	 ,gil dF dm 	12	 13 F	 14	 15
where EF is years of education for the female. We have also
tried males education but it turned out to have no significant
influence. Unemployment variables have not been included due
to the low rate of unemployment in Norway in 1979 (below 2 per
cent).
The estj.mation is based on a procedure suggested by 	 •
McFadden [22] which yields results that are close to the full
information maximum likelihood method. We are not able to use
the exact likelihood function to estimate the model because
the evaluation of the integrals in (4.11)-(4.14) would be to
costly and cumbersome. The estimation procedure applied re-
places the continuous four-tuple integral in the denominators
of the densities by a sum over 70 and alternatively 30 random
points where each term is adjusted by appropriate weights. In
other words, the continuous logit model (4.11)-(4.14) is re-
placed by a discrete logit version with 70 (30) alternatives.
McFadden [ 2] has demonstrated that this method yields con-
sistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates.
It should be kept in mind that we are not able to sepa-
rate the structural coefficients in the mean utility function
from some of the parameters of the densities g 5F and g 5m .
However, if we keep the parameters of these densities as well
as the parameters of cp fixed we are able to perform any simu-
lations including the calculation of wage elasticities.
The results of the estimation are shown in table II and
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III. Two alternatives are presented. In the first alternative
we have used 70 draws or discrete alternatives for each couple
and in the second, 30 draws. Moreover, in the first alterna-
tive tax deductions. are set equal to the maximum of observed
deductions and standard deductions. Of course, for the
observed hours of work actual deductions will be the maximum
(which for some individuals might be equal to standard
deductions). The model requires, however, that marginal taxes
as well as taxes paid and consumption are evaluated for all
other feasible alternatives. In the first estimation
alternative tax deductions are equal to the maximum of
observed deductions, related to the observed hours of . work,
and standard deductions. This alternative is thus to be
interpreted as a conditional model given the observed
deductions. A model closer to an unconditional model is one
for which deductions vary with income. In Norway deductions
are highly correlated with income since interest payments are
equal to the maximum of standard' deductions and predicted
deductions based on an estimated tax deduction function. The
estimated tax deduction function is reported_in the Appendix.
The results Show that the difference between these two
estimation alternatives is small. The 5 per cent confidence
interval overlap for all coefficients. In what follows we will
refer to alternative 2 as the base case and all comments given
below are related to this case. Elasticities will be calcu-
lated on the basis of this case, as well.
[Table II]
[Table III]
Except for the cross leisure term all variables have a
significant influence on the hours of work and wage distri-
bution. The 'mean utility' function is estimated to be a
strictly concave function in C and L, and the mean 'marginal
utility' of consumption is positive for all admissible values
of C.
The estimates imply that the female's marginal utility of
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leisure increases with age and number of children. If we take
the youngest female in the sample (27 years of age) without
children as a reference case, her 'marginal utility' of
working is positive when h < 423. If we consider a woman with
one child below 6, thèn the 'marginal utility' of working is
negative for all h and if we consider a woman with one child
between 6 and 18, then the 'marginal utility' of working be-
comes negative for h < 227. A woman of 42 . .5 years of age or
older', without children, has a negative marginal utility of
working for all h.
Results not reported here show that for men the number of
children has no impact on the marginal utility of leisure.
For both sexes age affects behavior directly through the
utility of leisure. Moreover, experience and therefore age has
an impact on behavior through the choice set B and therefore
through the wage equation. Wage rates are estimated to be a
concave function of experience with a peak at 31.5 years of
experience for men and at 30.9 years for women.
The wife's education turns out to affect the fraction of
feasible market matches sugh that a higher educated woman has
more job opportunities than a less educated. Moreover, edu-
cation is estimated to have a positive impact on wages and it
seems that education has a stronger relative impact on female
wage rates than on wage rates among men.
We end this section with the results of the tests of the
assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives.
As stated above the IIA property implies that the ratio
of the probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is in-
dependent of the other alternatives in the choice set. The
continuous logit model we have developed has the property that
the mean utility function for alternative (h,w) depends only
on the attributes associated with this alternative, namely
C=C(hF ,hM ,wF ,wM ) Where C(hF ,hM ,wF ,wM ) means that consumption. 
is evaluated at hours and wages (hF ,hm ,wF ,wm ). Accordingly it
satisfies IIA. In general the mean utility at (hF ,hm ,wF ,wm )
could also depend on consumption values at other hours and
wages. An implication of IIA is that the parameters remain
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unchanged when the model is estimated conditional on a re-
stricted subset of the full choice set. This is the basis for
the Hausman-McFadden specification test (HMT) [14]. We have
performed several versions of the test. They show that in most
cases (13 out of 16 tests) the IA -hypothesis is not rejected.
The details of the estimation procedure as well as of the HMT
tests will be reported in a forthcoming paper.
7. Wage and income elasticities 
In labor supply studies it is common to report individual
elasticities or elasticities, for mean sample values, or for
subsamples of individuals who are grouped according to some
socio-demographic Characteristics. This is meaningful when the
error terms are assumed to be independent of C and h. This is
not the case in our model since
max U(h F' hM' f(h F (z F )WF (z F ), hM WM (zM ),I) z)eB





(hF,hm)	 vg(hF,hm). + ( 2 F (h F ) , Em (hm )
where	 (h ), j=F,M, denotes the optimal match, given h,.
The conditional expected utility, (t)(.), evaluated for
mean sample values of the variables is the utility concept
that comes closest to the one used by others in the calcu-
lation of elasticities. However, the utility expression ap-
pearing in the probabilities in the likelihood function is not
4), but ()*, which is a mixture of 4) and the densities, g5,5j
reflecting 'rationing' on hours. We are not able to separate cp
from g5j without introducing further assumptions. But if a
shift in an exogeneous variable does not change the
'rationing' densities, then elasticities calculated on the
basis of (p* might approximate supply elasticities for the
'mean sample' individual.
With these reservations in mind we have calculated local
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elasticities for the mean sample individual given that he or
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m. = w.(1-S) = marginal rate; j=M,F,
J
A
I = I(1-SI) + E d jb = virtual income, j=M,F,
jb	 jb
d jb = E
k=1 
tk ilk - Ek=1 tkRk_i
and where Rk - Rk_ i denotes the size of the tax-bracket k
measured in NOK. tk is the marginal tax rate on tax segment k.
jb indicates that the optimal tax bracket for the represen-
tative individual is jb. Note that the tax rules in Norway
imply that capital income is allocated to the spouse with the
highest income, in most cases the husband.
Sample averages are used to calculate these elasticities.
The elasticities are denoted mean utility, mean sample elas-
ticities and the following ones are reported in table IV:
- uncompensated elasticities, hours h, with respect to w,
J
(Cournot elasticities)
compensated or utility constant elasticities (Slutsky)
Total income elasticities (Cournet minus Slutsky)
- virtual income elasticities (which are the elasticities of
h. with respect to t
- consumption constant elasticities (Frisch elasticities).
[Table IV]
Compared to what others have obtained (see Kiliingsworth
[19] for a review) our calculated elasticities are all of a
reasonable magnitude and of the expected sign. Females are
calculated to be more wage-responsive than males and Slutsky-
elasticities show that substitution effects are strong,
especially for women.
Another set of elasticities arise when we consider how
the distribution of labor supply is affected by changes in
say, wage levels. These elasticities are denoted aggregate
ones since they take into account the unobserved and observed
heterogeneity in the population. Moreover, they do not re-
quire, as the above calculation of mean utility elasticities
does, that behavior is determined by local criteria. They also
permit marginal utilities of working to be positive.at the
point of adjustment Which might be optimal if the individual
is constrained.
For the sake of expository simplicity let 4)(h,w,r) denote
the labor supply distribution conditional on the observed
vectors of household characteristics, r, and let
(0(h,w) = f(I)(h,w,r)r(r)dr
be the aggregate (per capita) labor supply distribution func-
tion where r(r) is the density of r. Since the sample is re-
presentative with respect to r an estimate of the aggregate
distribution is obtained by
(7.5)
A
(0(1,w) = E (0(h,w,r )
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where r i denotes the enumeration of the sample. The aggregate
(marginal) hours of work distribution can be estimated by
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(7.6)	 ;(h) =0(h,w.,r.) .
1 1
Similarly, we can estimate various conditional aggregate
distributions as for instance the marginal distribution of the
male supply, given that the wife works.
Table V gives the aggregate elasticities. Three types of
elasticities are shown.
Let ' (0) denote the probability that individual i, sex
j is not working and let






is equal to 'the expected number of participating individuals
of sex j in the sample.
The first line in table V gives the elasticity of N, with
respect to wage levels. N is the total number of households in
the sample.
The second and third line give the elasticities of the
conditional and unconditional expectation of hours worked,
respectively. With the simplified notation introduced above
the unconditional expectation of hours supplied in the popu-
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and the conditional expectation (conditional on working) is
c	 N 3600(7.10)	 H. = E	 E x
i=1 x>0




where 3600 is the upper limit on hours worked per year.
[Table V]
These elasticities give the impact on the labor supply
aggregates specified in (7.8)-(7.10) from a 1 per cent in-.
crease in the wage levels for all individuals and they are the
result of a simulation by using the model with these new wage
levels replacing the initial ones.
The results show that female participation is slightly
more elastic than hours supplied, conditional on working. For
men the opposite is true. Moreover, hours supplied, con-
ditional on working, is almost inelastic.
The elasticities in the second line can be compared with
the Cournot elasticities given in table ry. We observe that
the cross terms are not only of the same sign, but they are
nearly identical. Since the aggregate elasticities are the
most reliable ones, we observe that the mean utility elastici-
ties overestimate the own-wage response to a great extent.
The last line of table V is approximately equal to the
sum of the first and second line, since for each individual
the unconditional.expectation of hours supplied equals 	 the
product of the participation probability and the expected
hours worked, conditional on participation. The total supply
elasticities imply that a partial 1 per cent wage increase in
the male wage rates will increase expected hours supplied by
men by 0.33 per cent and reduce expected hours supplied by
women by 0.54 percent.
Women are more wage responsive than men since a 1 per
cent increase in the female wage rates will increase expected
hours supplied by 1.2 per cent. The negative impact on the
males labor supply is rather weak, 0.13 per cent.
An overall:wage increase of 1 per cent can be found by
adding own-wage and cross-wage elasticities. The positive
impact of an overall wage increase on female labor supply is
substantially lower than a partial increase, a fact that
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should be kept in mind When cross-section estimates are com-
pared with estimates based on partial time-series studies in
which male and female wage rates grow almost at the same rate.
8. Estimation under alternative budget specifications 
In addition to the estimation alternatives reported in
table II we have applied the McFadden estimation method (with
30 draws) • to the following alternative specifications of the
budget constraint:
i)	 Smoothed tax function without kinks, one for separate
and another one for joint taxation. The applied func-
tions are described in Appendix	 ("Smoothed tax func-
tions").
1i)	 Standard tax deductions instead of actual, observed tax
deductions ("Standard deductions").
iii)	 No marginal taxes, taxes paid are constant and equal to
the observed taxes paid by the household for all h ("No
marginal taxes").
The results are given in table VI.
A striking result is that counterfactual specifications
of the budget set such as a smoothed tax-function rather than
the full representation of all kinks in the tax system, and
standard deductions rather than the actual and observed de-
ductions, have small impact on the estimates of the coef-
ficients. These.results are important since the present labor
study is the first one with access to filled in tax returns.
In a majority of empirical labor supply studies US data have
been used in which one is forced to use standard deductions to
evaluate effective tax rates. Moreover, until recently the
non-convexities in the budget sets generated by a non-uniform
progressiveness of the tax system have also been ignored. Our
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results indicate that these misspecifications might not yield
quite misleading results.
Another, but expected finding is that the ignorance of
marginal taxes, the "No marginal taxes" case, give estimates
quite different from the other alternatives. The coefficients
a ll a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 , a 9 , a 10 and a 1 5 are all estimated to be
significantly different from what we obtained in the base
case. If the parameters, erroneously, are considered as esti-
mates of the utility function, then the results imply that the
marginal utility of leisure for most of the females are under-
estimated and that the cross term in the utility function is
overestimated.
The ignorance of marginal taxes implies quite different
elasticities from what is obtained in the other cases. Own-
wage responses are substantially lowered and the numerical
values of the cross elasticities are higher. The upward bias
in cross response of female labor supply is particularly
strong which might be one explanation why previous studies
have reported strong cross terms, see Ashenfelter and Heckman
•[3]. The downward bias in own-wage responses, when marginal
taxes are ignored, supports the theoretical conclusions drawn
by Blomquist [5].
[Table VI]
9. Policy simulations 
To demonstrate how the model can be used in policy simu-
- lations we have simulated the impact of six changes of the tax
system.
The simulation experiments are based on the represén-
tation (7.1). The set of feasible hours is a continuum but it
can be demonstrated that we obtain a good approximation to the
aggregate predictions by drawing a few feasible hours for each
individual. We have drawn 15 values of h for each . spouse. In
addition each individual has the option of not working (hours
worked less than 60 hours a year). Finally, 256 corresponding
values are drawn from the extreme value distribution for each
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couple to simulate realizations of the error terms. The pre-
sent simulations are performed conditional on the observed
wages as the reference case. However, the model allows us to
draw wage observations that corresponds to the feasible hours.
Simulations have been performed on a larger sample than
the one used in estimating the model, since those excluded due
to low quality (or missing) of the observations of the endo-
geneous variables have been included here.
Column I of Table VII gives the base predictions. All
variables are on a per capita basis.
The following policy simulations have been performed:
I. A 10 per cent reduction in all marginal tax rates.
II. Removal of the option of joint taxation.
III. As II, but total tax revenue is kept constant. Since the
' removal of joint taxation increases tax revenue, a uni-
form cut in all tax rates is carried out in order to keep
tax revenue constant. The model is used to find this
reduction and it amounts to a 16.7 per cent cut in all
tax rates (not percentage points).
IV. The flat tax rate on gross earnings is increased from 5
percentage points to 10 percentage points. In a first
alternative marginal taxes levied on net, taxable income
are cut uniformly in order to keep tax revenue constant.
The needed reduction is 33.3 per cent. In a second al-
ternative aggregate consumption is kept constant which
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implies a cut of 14.3 per cent. Both alternatives imply
that tax rates in the progressive part of the schedule
are reduced and proportional tax elements are expanded
and this alternative is therefore called reduced progres-
siveness.
All simulation are partial in the sence that the impact
on wage levels are not considered. An equilibrium exercise of
that kind is left for the future.
[Table yii]
As seen from table VII, a 10 per cent across-the-board-
cut in all marginal taxes, but keeping the progressive tax
structure as of 1979 unchanged, stimulates labor supply. Women
are more responsive than men. Tax revenue is lowered which
might disappoint those who argue that revenue can be raised
through tax cuts with a reference to supply side factors. A
point to *orry about is that consumption increases more than
gross earnings which indicate increased imports, deteroriation
of the balance of payments and a future need for raising
taxes. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse
how expectations of future tax increases are formed and how
they might influence present behavior.
A removal of joint taxation has a strong impact on female
labor supply. When the changes are decomposed into partici-
pation effects and effects on hours supplied, conditional on
working, we find that female participation rates are increased
by 9.7 percentage points; that is an increase from the initial
participation rate of 69.7 per cent to 79.4 per cent. Hours
supplied, conditional on working, is increased by 6.3 per
cent. An interesting point is that the male labor supply sup-
plyis negatively affected. Thus, the results meet the expec-
tation that the tax systems in countries like Norway, UK,
France and West-Germany imply strong disincentives for women
in the labor market.
Table VIII reports the relative number of transitions
between participation and non-participation, given that the
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non-pecuniary attributes, T(z), as well as the unobservables
affecting preferences, e(z), remain unchanged. Off-diagonal
elements indicate changes and the most noteworthy result is
the transition of 33 per cent of the females from the category
where initially only the males were working to a category
where both are working.
[Table VIII]
The removal of joint taxation increases tax revenue and a
tax neutral change is shown in column III of table VII. The
important point is that female labor supply gets further
stimulated and the negative impact on labor supply is turned
into a positive effect.
The last two columns of table VII give the effect of re-
duced progressiveness. In a tax neutral simulation labor sup-
ply and gross earnings, as well as consumption, are sub-
stantially increased and the results show that progressive tax
rates might cause serious efficiency losses. Also in this case
the increase in consumption is a point to worry about.
The last column gives the result of a simulation when
Aggregate consumption is kept constant. Although the effects
are drastically reduced they still show the negative effects
of progressive taxes on labor supply.
10. Conclusion.
The basic idea in this paper is to adapt the framework of
discrete choice models to the analysis of household labor
supply. This is done by introducing latent choice oppor-
tunities called matches. Given the match, then wages, hours of
work and non-pecuniary characteristics follow. This framework
has the advantage of being consistent with latent rationing on
hours and job-opportunities and it is also well suited for
taking into account general budget constraints.
The model is estimated on Norwegian data from 1979. The
model allows for a detailed specification of the tax system.
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This system, as well as the tax system of most countries, is
not uniformly progressive. This creates a non-convex budget
set and the model is designed to allow for this.
Some of the results are summarized in wage elasticities
and these are shown to be in the range of what others have
obtained. We calculate aggregate elasticities in which ob-
served as well as unobserved heterogeneity are taken into
account and we argue that these elasticities are more reliable
than the traditional individual elasticities.
In the final section we report the results of some policy
simulations. Noteworthy results are in the first place the
strong and positive impact on female labor supply of removing
joint taxation. Second, the results show some strong negative
effects of progressive taxes on labor supply.
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Appendix . Norwegian tax rules as of 1979 
As mentioned in the introduction, the data set contains
observations based on filled in tax returns with information
about actual deductions and taxes paid by the households. The
model is specially designed to include tax and deduction rules
in a detailed way. This is in contrast with all other studies
in this field. Here we give a brief description of the
Norwegian tax rules as of 1979.
In a condensed form the tax rules can be desribed as
follows:
Let Rj , Yj , Q j denote the net and gross income and de-
ductions for spouse j, j=F,M, respectively. Taxes are levied
on net income according to the tax function S
1
(.) when the
spouses are jointly taxed, and by S 2 (.) when they are taxed
separately. A minor part of the taxes are based on gross in-
come according to the rule denoted by the function SG (.).
Thus, taxes paid by the household, S, is defined as
(A.1) S(R R Y Y ) =M' F' M' F
S 1 (ER)+ESG (Y.) when (RM' RF )eJj j 	 j 
E[S 2 (R i )+SG (Y i )] when (Rm ,RF )e RJ
,j




R. < R0 for at least one j,
R. = Y. -Q.
3.
and where R is given by the tax rules.
It is up to the household to decide whether they prefer
to be taxed separately or jointly. In 1979 the level of R i
that minimized the total taxes paid by the household was NOK
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22,000. The tax regions are shown on figure Al.
[Figure Al]
The region of joint taxation can be diVided into sub-
regions as marked on figure Al. Each sub-region constitutes a
tax-bracket. A similar division of the region of separate tax-
ation is indicated in the figure.
Deductions applied in the estimation of the model are
defined as
* 1(A.4)	 Q, = max [Qmin' () j jJ
where Qmin is a minimum tax allowance that every taxpayer has
the right to deduct. However, expenses such as interest on
loans, union fees, travel expenses over and above a given
limit are also deductible. Q, denotes the actual deductions
legitimately claimed by the taxpayer.
The minimum allowance, Qmin' depends on gross income
according to rules set out in table Al.
[Table Al]
We observe the actual deductions claimed by the taxpayers
and approved by the IRS. However, in principle, the econo-
metric model outlined in Section 2 requires that we predict
the deductions for all permissible values of the wage income
for all individuals in the sample. In one estimation alterna-
tive Eq. (A.4) is used to evaluate deductions outside the
observed point of adjustment. In another alternative Q, is
JA
replaced by an estimated deduction function, Q,. This function
captures the variation in deductions with income and with •
other variables.




(A.5) Q. = -229,323 + 0.109(wh) 4 + 0.188(IP
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where wh = wage income,
IP = pensions,
IK = capital income,
A = age.
The estimates are OLS-estimates. We observe that the
marginal propensity to deduct related to wage income is 0.109,
whereas the marginal propensity to deduct related to capital
income is much higher; 0.865. Deductions are estimated to vary
with age with a maximum at the age of 33.1.
Taxes related to net income follow from the rules repor-
ted in table All.
[Table All]
Taxes levied on gross income are given by the following
rule.
[Table AM]
In addition to the deduction and tax rules outlined so
far there are some special transfer payments related to the
number and age of children in the household. For children
below 17 years of age the parents received (in 1979) NOK 900
per child and NOK 1,200 for children between 17 and 20.
To illustrate the implications of the tax rules and de-
duction decisions on the effective marginal tax rates, we have
calculated the marginal tax rates for a married women with
-socioeconomic characteristics near the average of the sample
(age 35, 1 child under 13 years of age, her husband's annual
income is NOK 75,000 and her wage rate is NOK 40 per hour).
[Table AIV]
Table AIV shows that there are 24 tax-brackets altogether
of Which the top 4, or perhaps 5 or 6, are not feasible since
they require an unrealistic high working effort. Although the
woman considered has 6 wage rate per hour near the sample
average, her wage rate is still too low to make the highest
tax-brackets feasible with a realistic maximum amount of hours
worked per year. Table AIV makes it clear that effective
marginal tax rates are not uniformly increasing with income,
or, given the wage rate, with hours worked. The budget set is
therefore non-convex.
In Section 8 we have estimated a version of the model
with smoothed tax functions replacing the tax rules. Taxes
levied on gross income, SG' are kept according. to rules. the
tax functions Si (Rm+RF ) and S2 (R) specified in table All are
replaced by the following two functions:
Joint taxation:
S i (Rm+RF ) = log(1.46)10 -4 + 1.667 log(Rm+RF ) .
Separate taxation:
S 2 (R.) = 1og(4.66)10 -4 + 1.584 log R. ,	 j=M,F.3
We observe that the tax elasticity is slightly higher
under joint taxation than under separate taxation.
The marginal tax rates that correspond to rules and
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Table : Sample Values - Married Couples, Norway 1979.
Standard 	 Min. 	 Max.
Averages deviations values 	 values
Hours worked per year by wife
Hours worked per year by husband
Female wage rate, NOK per hour
Male wage rate, NOK per hour
Female labor income, NOK per year
Male labor income, NOK per year
Female pension income, NOK per year
Male pension income, NOK per year
Other female income, NOK per year
Other male income, NOK per year
Capital income of the household,
NOK per year
Wife's education in years
Husband's education in years
Age of the wife
Age of the husband
Number of children below 6
Number of children 7-20
Female participation rate, per cent
Male participation rate, per cent
	919 	 859 	 0 	 3 368
	
2 059 	 740 	 0 	 3 572
	
31.30 	 6.10 	 15.50 	 55.80
	
41.60 	 9.4 	 24.00 	 73.90
	
30 021 	 29 914 	 0 	 152 497
	
84 911 	 35 701 	 0 	 185 988
	
1 247 	 5 477 	 0 	 51 539
	
2 538 	 10 410 	 0 	 86 988
	
132 	 1 746 	 0 	 34 480
	




7 842 	 0 	 162 734
	
10.5 	 1.7 	 9.0 	 17.5
	
11.4 	 2.5 	 9.0 	 18.0
	
43.6 	 11.3 	 27 	 66
	
46.1 	 11.5 	 25 	 66
	
0.36 	 0.66 	 0 	 4
	
1.01 	 1.55 	 0 	 6
	
70.3 	 45.7 	 - 	 -
	
92.8 	 25.9 	 - 	 -
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Table II. Estimates of the mean utility function. Married couples in Norway 1979. Age of wife is
between 27 and 66 years.
Variables 	 Coefficients Estimation alternative 1.
70 draws. Tax deductions
equal to max [observed ded,
standard ded].
Estimation alternative 2.
30 draws, Tax deductions
equal to max [predicted ded,
standard ded].
. Estimektes 	 Standard errors 	 Estimates Standard errors














10-2LF 	 a4 0.4563 	 0.14 0.4751 0.14
10 -3 LFlogAF a 5 1.1547 	 0.24 1.0774 0.24
10
-6LFLm 	a6 0.0546 	 0.09 0.0690 0.09
10-3 LF BU6 	 a 7 1.0184 	 0.12 1.0137 0.12
10-3 LFB06 	 a8 0.2323 	 0.05 0.2a62 0.05
2
..10 6 L 	a9 -1.5667 	 - 	 0.12 -1.6693 0.12
10
 -2
LM 	 a 10
- 3
1.7988 	 0.17 1.8128 0.17
10LmlogAm 	
all 0.5299 	 0.22 0.6518 0.22
10KF 	 a 12 1.0114 	 0.07 1.0465 0.07
EFKF al3 -0.2724 	 0.07 -0.2990 0.07
10KM 	 a 14 1.3779 	 0.06 1.3834 0.06
10KFKm 	 a 15 -0.9729 	 0.04 -1.0177 0.04
15F 	 bF 0.8749 	 0.21 0.9145 0.21
DM 	b M 0.7257 	 0.13 0.7193 0.13
C = household consumption, L. = leisure time per year, h. = 8000-L.
J J J
BU6, B06 = number of children below/above 6 years of age
A. = age
J
if h. < 60
J-
19,) otherwise










































Experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus seven.
48
Table IV. Mean utility (mean sample) elasticities, Norway




Type of elasticity 	 Own 	 Cross 	 Own 	 Cross
Cournot 	 0.19 	 -0.04 	 1.05 	 -0.25
Slutsky 	 0.23 	 -0.02 	 1.17 	 -0.02
Total income	 -0.04	 -	 -0.12	 -
Virtual income	 -0.01	 -	 -0.01	 -
Frisch 	 0.24 	 0.01 	 1.33 	 0.03
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Table V. Aggregate labor supply elasticities, Norway 1979
Male elasticities 	 Female elasticities 
Type of elasticity 	 Own 	 Cross 	 Own 	 Cross






tional exp. of total




























































































Table VI. Estimates and asymptotic standard deviations under alternative specifications of the budget con-
straint. McFadden estimation method with 30 draws to represent possible choices of hours and error

























10-2LF a4 0.4751 0.1392 0.4504
ay 	 arra0.4mil a5 1.0774 0.2363 1.0580
10
-6
LFLM 0.0690 0.0860 0.0791
10-3 LFBU6 57 1.0137 0.1192 1.0125
10
-3LF806 cs8 0.2262 0.0474 0.2276
-6 2
10 	 LM 59 -1.6694 0.1224 -1.6919
- 2
10LM 210 1.8128 0.1735 1.8262
10
-3
LmlogAm 211 0.6518 0.2198 0.6472
10 KF 212 1.0465 0.0716 1.0494
EFKF 213 -0.2989 0.0691 -0.3028
10 Km al4 1.3834 0.0597 1.3971
10 KFKm
215 -1.0177 0.0396 -1.0393
DF bF 0.9144 0.2046 0.9218















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table AI: Intervals for








10,000-16,000 	 0.041 + 4,600
	
16,000-17,500 	 0.141 + 3,000
	
















































































9,000- 11,500 	 0.251 - 2,250
• 	 11,599-182,400 	 0.05Y
182,400- 	 9,120
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Table AIV: Effective total marginal tax rates for a married
woman age 35, one child under 13 years of ag, her
wage rate is NOK 40 per hour and her husband's
income is NOK 75,000 per year, near average sample
values). Norway 1979.
•
Gross income 	 Hours .worked




per cent Remarks       
	0- 2,000	 0- 	 50 	 0
	
2,000- 9,000 	 50- 225 	 23.0 	 Joint
	
9,000- 9,500 	 225- 238 	 48.0 	 taxation
	
9,500- 10,000 	 238- 250 	 63.4 	 , minimizes
	
10,000- 10,833 	 250- 270 	 61.9
	
10,833- 11,250 	 270- 281 	 66.6 	 taxes paid
	
11.250- 16,000 	 281- 400 	 46.7 	 by the
	
16,000- 17,500 	 400- 438 	 42.3 	 household
	
17,500- 22,777 	 438- 	 570 	 44.1


























































































































Figure 1. Frequency bar chart, Hours of work per year, sales, Norway 1979
Freq Cum. Percent Cu..
	fr q 	 percent
	55 	 55 	 7.07 	 7.07
	
56 	 0.13 	 7.20
	
57 	 0.13 	 7.33
- 	 2 	 59 	 0.26 	 • 7.58
	
- I 	 60 	 0.13 	 7.71
- 2 	 62 	 0.26 	 7.97
	
0 	 62 	 0.00 	 7.97
	
63 	 0.13 	 8.10
	
64 	 0.13 	 8.23
	
65 	 0.13 	 $.35
- 3 	 68 	 0.39 	 -8.74
	
69 	 0.13 	 8.87
	
70 	 0.13 	 9.00
- 2 	 72 	 0.26 	 9.25
- 2 	 74 	 0.26 	 9.51
- o 	 74 	 0.00 	 9.51
- 1 	 75 	 0.13 	 9.64
	
2 	 77 	 0.26 	 9.90
- 0 	 77 	 0.00 	 9.90
- 1 	 78 	 0.13 	 10.03
- 4 	 62 	 0.51 	 10.54
- 	 3 	 85 	 0.39 	 10.93
	
86 	 0.13 	 11.05
	
- I 	 87 	 0.13 	 11.18
- 2 	 89 	 0.26 	 14.44
- 3 	 92 	 0.39 	 11.83
	- 4 	 96 	 0.51 	 12.34
- 6 	 102 	 0.77 	 13.11
- 8 	 110 	 1.03 	 14.14
- 17 	 127 	 2.19 	 16.32
- 16 	 143 	 2.06 	 18.38
- 18 	 161 	 2.31 	 20.69
	
- 31 	 • 192 	 3.98 	 24.68
- 41 	 233 	 5.27 	 29.95
- 46 	 279 	 5.91 	 35.86
	 - 71 	 350 	 9.13 	 44.99
	
56 	 406 	 7.20 	 52.19
- 62 	 468 	 7.97 	 60.15
- 52 	 520 	 6.68 	 66.84
- 37 	 557 	 4:76 	 71.59
- 31 	 588 	 3.98 	 75.58
- 33 	 621 	 4.24 	 79.82
- 21 	 642 	 2.70 	 82.52
- 22 	 664 	 2.83 	 $5.35
- 18 	 682 	 2.31 	 87.66
- 14 	 696 	 1.80 	 89.46
- 12 	 708 	 1.54 	 91.00
	
13 	 721 	 1.67 	 92.67
- 6 	 727 	 0.77 	 93.44
- 9 	 736 	 1.16 	 94.60
- 4 	 740 	 0.51 	 95.12
- 3 	 743 	 0.39 	 95.50
- 3 	 746 	 0.39 	 95.89
- 7 	 753 	 0.90 	 96.79
	
- 5 	 758 	 0.64 	 97.43
	- 5 	 763 	 0.64 	 98.07
	
- 5 	 768 	 0.64 	 98.71
	
- • 3 	 771 	 0.39 	 99.10
- 5 	 776 	 0.64 	 99.74
- 1 	 777 	 0.13 	 99.87
- 1 	 78 	 0.13 	 100.00
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Figure A2 Marginal tax rates that correspond to rules and smoothed tex
functions.
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